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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the market power of soybean price. Data used in this research was the statistic data of 
Time series (1989-2008). Data was estimated by using OLS (Ordinary Least Square). Before estimating the data, the stationary 
condition of every variable was tested by using ADF Test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test). The results found that market power 
significantly affects soybean price, value of conjectural elasticity 0.39162. Market power can increase the price of processed 
soybean products amounted to 38.8161 percent in output markets and increase the wholesale price of soybean 19.3981 in the 
input market. Soybean prices are set by government policy to encourage the local soybean production increased from farmers and 
to the development of soybean industry, need to consider the influence of market power on soybean price. 
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1. Introduction 
Oligopoly in soybean market can be indicated by the authority of some soybean wholesale traders and industries 
which use soybean as raw material. In oligopoly market, the wholesale traders or soybean industries have the power 
in deciding the price, the maximization profit is gotten when marginal revenue (MR) is equal to marginal cost 
(MC). Oligopoly power in pricing will be bigger if there is collusion among oligopolies.  
The power of oligopoly market in pricing strongly depends on demand elasticity and conjectural, when the high 
farmers’ supply will lower the price that the farmers get because of the demand inelasticity and supply elasticity 
which reactivate to the price changing in the stagnant farmers’ selling price (Appelbaum, 1979 and Sexton, 1990). 
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Beside conjectural elasticity, another indicator which can be used to measure the power of oligopoly market in 
pricing is Lerner index (Sheperd, 1990). In this research, market power was analyzed from conjectural elasticity.   
According to Chalilet al. (2006), market power created by oligopoly is often seen as a problem because it often 
creates inefficiency, decreases social welfare, and leads an unfair condition in income distribution among marketing 
agents. Because of that, the government intervention is needed to decide a policy which can give contribution in 
social welfare, the efforts of increasing the soybean farmers’ income and the development of soybean industry.  
The problem of this study is how big the influence of market power to soybean price is. Related to that problem, 
this research purposes to analyze the influence of market power to soybean price. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Market Power Measurement Model 
2.1.1. Lerner Index 
In 1934, A.P. Lerner served the concept of monopoly and its measurement. He considers monopoly level as price 
proportion which is signed by marginal cost. Later, this concept is known as Lerner Index that is specifically 
formulated by Sheperd into (Sheperd, 1990): 
p
mcp
L
−
=     (1) 
L    = monopoly level or Lerner Index, mc = marginal cost, and p = output price. Lerner (1934) defines monopoly 
power level as monopoly revenue percentage per output unit. On the other words, it can be also defined as markup 
percentage above marginal cost. In the perfect competitive market, there is no markup, and Lerner Index (L) is zero. 
On the other hand, in pure monopolistic, Lerner Index is one.  
In profit maximization when marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue, Lerner Index may be the inverse of 
demand elasticity. 
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Based on this equation, the low demand elasticity can cause industry to have a high power market. In high 
demand elasticity, price ascending can influence consumers to lower their demands. Because of that, seller cannot 
control the high price. The demand elasticity of industry is still earmarked by market demand and the supply 
elasticity of other industries; 
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and Lerner Index can also be written as: 
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ε     (3) 
mi means industry, mj means market share, 
172   I. Ketut Arnawa and Ratya Anindita /  Agriculture and Agricultural Science Procedia  9 ( 2016 )  170 – 180 
j
sε  
Refers to supply elasticity of other industries, and εD is market demand elasticity. Market demand elasticity and 
supply elasticity can control monopoly market. The stronger the elasticity, industry elasticity will be stronger too, 
and monopoly power will be weaker. This Lerner Index version is often used in studying the market power of 
dominant company (Chalil et al., 2006). 
  
Lerner Index can also be modified as the measurement of monopsony power (buyer power). It is different from 
monopoly/oligopoly power:  
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In dynamic frame, based on the first order condition of cost adjustment model (Carlton and Perloff, 2000) Lerner 
Index can be written as: 
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Shows the different index with one static, μit = qit –qi,t-1the difference among output when t and t-1. In dynamic 
index, power market is not only controlled by the effect of industry reaction to the sum choice resulted by industry. 
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and market demand elasticity (εt), but also from adjustment cost and direct dynamic externality (DDE), which 
become the effect of future choice to self-choice, 
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 and also indirect dynamic externality (IDE), is the effect of company future choice to the present choice 
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By interpretation and similar steps, the measurement of oligopsony power can be written as: 
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mvt  is marginal value when t and p is input price in time t. Another version of dynamic Lerner Index was found 
in Hunnicutt and Aadland study (2003) in Chalil et al. (2006), which uses inventory border to get a dynamic 
condition and determine discount profit 
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y, w and S are input aggregate or output supply in a certain period. Supply function inverse and stock level, 
successively can be written into,  
jdy
dyjR =  
and St+1 = f(St, yg,t) first order condition is written into:  
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The measurement of oligopoly power is equal to Lerner Index, in this case it will become: 
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 Lerner Model has stimulated the new imperfect market model development that is New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) which was developed by Appelbaum (1981) and Schroeter (1988). 
2.1.2. Conjectural Elasticity 
Conjectural Elasticity is another indicator which can be used to measure the power of oligopoly market; 
Appelbaum (1982) formulated the rate power of oligopoly market as: 
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y
jy  is market share jth company. 
The simple model of Appelbaum is developed if oligopolies faces cost function and demand function. If 
industrial cost function  jth is shown by Cj = Cj (yj , w)where yj is industry outputjth  and w is input price vector, so y = 
j (p,z) as demand function where p means output price and z means shifter demand vectors. Industry profit 
maximization jth is shown by (13). 
max [pyj – Cj (yj , w): y = J (p,z)]    (13) 
where y = ∑j yj 
The optimum condition which is suitable with profit maximization problem which is given to (13) is shown by 
(14). 
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If demand elasticity for normal stuff is always negative, it can be formulated as: if θjis positive, industry can gain 
the higher price than in competitive market. If demand elasticity is constant, conjectural elasticity and price will be 
higher. This condition shows that market power is higher.  
Figure 1 describes the equation condition (14) in graphic form where p (1+ θj/ η) is marginal revenue (MR) and δ 
Cj(yj, w)/ δ yj is marginal cost (MC). The equilibrium is on E point. Price is prescribed in p when Qj quantity is 
intersected with the demand of company product (Dj = rj.Dm) in which Dj and Dm is the product demand of industry 
and market and rj is industry market stock. This market is in equilibrium in price p and quantity Qm. 
 
Figure 1. Industry Pricing Jth in Imperfect Market Structure when only Output Market Price is considered (Adapted from Schroeter, 1988). 
(harga=price) 
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More complex model (Schroeter, 1988) indicates the problem when industry jth faces demand that is given for 
output and supply that is given for input. This analysis needs the separation of interest cost of raw material input 
from the total cost. Because of that, industry profit function can be written in this equation (15). 
 W)Cj(yj, - Rj .Wr -  p.yj = π     (15) 
Where: Wr  refers to the input price of raw material, Rj means the input quantity of raw material which is used by 
industry jth . Profit maximization condition needs the first equation derivative (15) to output to have zero as the 
result. Therefore, it can result the equation (16). 
C jM
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θ    (16) 
Where; η refers to market demand elasticity, e means market supply elasticity, τ = ration of input-output 
conversion as if ∑ R = y or z Rj = yj,,MCj’= the input marginal cost of non-raw material. 
Equation (16) shows that industry can gain maximum profit when MR = MC. Therefore, p(1+ θ j/η) is industry 
marginal revenue to product, while Wr (1 + θ j/e) is raw material marginal cost to product. The latest must be added 
in the input marginal cost of non-raw material to get total marginal cost.  
This model shows that industry jth can use its profit in product and input market. It is interesting to be observed 
that conjectural elasticity of company appears in the two sides of equation. It means that industry can use its market 
power in input and output market.  
Figure 2 shows the graphic condition of equation (16) where the input market is combined with the output one. 
By assuming that the notation is the same like in Figure 1, industry marginal revenue and its marginal cost is p (1 + 
θ j/η) and Wr (1 + θ j/e) + δj/δyδ that intersect in E point and result profit maximization for industry. Industry will 
decide the output price in p and the input price in Wr. It buys raw material input and sells products Qj unit. 
Equilibrium price and market quantity are p,Wr and QM. 
 
Figure 2. Industry PricingJth in Imperfect Market Structure when Input and Output Market are Considered at the Same Time (Adapted from 
Schroeter, 1988). (harga=price; jumlah=total). 
2.2. Statistical Analyses 
2.2.1. Research Data 
Data used in this research was the statistic data of Time series (1989-2008) which was gotten from Statistic 
Center Board, Agriculture Ministry and related institutions in East Java. Data was estimated by using OLS 
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(Ordinary Least Square). Before estimating the data, the stationary condition of every variable was tested by using 
ADF Test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test).  
2.3. Analysis Model 
2.3.1. Market Power Analysis 
Model which is used to analyze oligopoly market power in soybean market is oligopoly model from Appelbaum -
Schroeter (1982). This model uses conjectural elasticity to measure market power. The benefit of conjectural 
elasticity is it can measure price power in input and output market of soybean market, while Lerner Index only tends 
to measure market power in output market. Soybean industry is used s the analysis unit because it faces the demand 
given for output and the supply given for input. Therefore, it will be known how strong market power can influence 
soybean price both in input and output markets. The formula below is used to know how strong oligopoly market 
can influence the price in soybean market: 
C jM
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θ    (17) 
Where: P is the output price of processed soybean, e means the supply elasticity of soybean seed, η means the 
output demand elasticity of processed soybean, Wr is the wholesale price of soybean,τ = the conversion ratio of 
soybean input-output becoming processed soybean product, MCj is marginal cost of soybean industry, and θj means 
industry conjectural elasticity 
2.3.2. Soybean Supply Elasticity  
Soybean supply elasticity is estimated from soybean supply function. Soybean supply is formulated as the 
equation below (18) 
T.e)F,Pn, Qsimp, f(Wr, = Qs    (18) 
where: 
Qs   = the supply of level two soybean which is used in soybean industry  
Wr= wholesale soybean price in East Java  
Qsimp= the total of imported soybean  
Pn      = retail price of Urea fertilizer  
F       = the amount of annual rainfall  
T       = trend of time  
e        = error item 
2.3.3. Supply Elasticity of Processed Soybean Product  
Supply elasticity of processed soybeanproduct is estimated from demand function of total market for processed 
product made from soybean.  
(Qds + Qdsimp – ΔS) = f(Pt, Ppo, I, e)  (19) 
where:   
Qds     = total supply of processed soybean product from company  
Odsimp= volume of imported processed soybean product  
ΔS     = changing in the stock of processed soybean  
Pt= price of processed soybeanproduct  
Ppo     = price of processed product made from other materials  
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I         = consumer per capita income  
εo       = error 
2.3.4. Marginal Cost (MCj) 
Theoretical model differentiates material input cost from other inputs. Appelbaum (1982), Schroter (1988), 
Sexton (1990) suggest Leontief generalized finance function to be assumed as output linear function.  It shows 
constant marginal cost for the cost of industry raw material. The functional form of raw material cost is formulated 
in this equation below (20) 
TC’ = ω0 + ω1.Qd  (20) 
Where:  
TC = total cost of processed soybean product process  
 ω0= total fixed cost  
 ω1= marginal cost of raw material input  
Qd= total output of processed soybean product 
From that equation (20), ω1 refers to marginal cost of raw material input, not from soybean itself, which is the 
result of equation differentiation (20) to output (Qd) or the value of MC. 
2.3.5. Conjectural Elasticity (Market Power) 
Conjectural elasticity is estimated from the equation (17) so that it is gained the equation (21) below: 
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From the equation (21), conjectural elasticity can be estimated as the equation (22) and (23): 
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3. Result and Discussion 
3.1.  Conjectural Elasticity 
Conjectural elasticity is the parameter which is used to measure oligopoly market power in soybean market in 
influencing input and output prices. The value of conjectural elasticity = 0,3916 which is not the same as zero 
significantly influences price in soybean market. According to Alppelbaum – Schroter. (1982), high conjectural 
elasticity can give the strong power for industry to have the power market both in input and output markets. On the 
other hand, low conjectural elasticity only gives the weak power for industry in input and output markets. This 
condition will also happen if industry does not have any market power in pricing.  
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3.2. Market Power Analysis in Soybean Market 
Oligopoly market power is shown on Table 1, without the consideration of market power, soybean wholesale 
price in input market is Rp. 3.210,17/kg and the price of processed soybean product in output market is Rp. 
7.273,00/kg. However, if power market is considered, the power of oligopoly market in soybean market can raise 
the price in input market as much as 19,39 percent for the soybean wholesale price from Rp 3.210,17/kg becomes 
Rp. 3.833,48/kg, and oligopoly market power can raise the price in output one as much as  38,81 percent for the 
price of processed soybean product from Rp 7.273,00/kg becomes Rp. 10.095,70/kg. If soybean marginal price in 
farmer level and soybean wholesale price in wholesalers level is assumed as much as 26,14 percent, the soybean 
price in farmer level should raise from Rp 2.371,40 becomes Rp 2.831,47/kg. However, the price is difficult, or even 
never happens, to rise because there is market power influence which leads soybean price in farmer level is still 
cheap. Graphically, the influence of oligopoly market power for the price in soybean market is shown in Figure 3. It 
is shown the input and output markets condition that soybean price is fixed if power market is not considered. 
However, if it is considered, soybean price in input market will raise less than in output market. 
Table 1.  The analysis of Oligopoly Market Power Influence to Soybean Price in Input and OutputMarket 
 
Variable 
Basic 
Simulation 
(Rp/kg) 
Price Changing 
(Rp/kg) 
Changing 
Percentage 
(%) 
Soybean Price 
(Rp/kg) 
Without Market Power     
Wholesale Soybean Price (Wr) 3.210,67 0,00 0,00 3.210,67 
Soybean Price in Farmer Level (Pf)*  2.371,40*    2.371,40* 
Price of Processed Soybean Product  (Pt) 7.273,00 0,00 0,00 7.273,00 
With Market Power     
Wholesale Soybean Price (Wr) 3.210,67 622,8087 19,39 3.833,48 
Soybean Price in Farmer Level (Pf)*  2.371,40*   2.831,47* 
Price of Processed Soybean Product  (Pt) 7.273,00 2.822,66 38,81   10.095,70 
Explanation: )* is assumed as soybean marginal price in farmer level and wholesalers  26,14 % 
 
Figure 3. The Influence of Oligopoly Market Power to Soybean Price in Input andOutput Market 
4. Conclusion 
Market power influences soybean price significantly. Conjectural elasticity as much as 0,3916. Market power can 
raise the price in input market as much as 19,3981 percent to the wholesale soybean price and it can also raise the 
price in output market as much as 38,8161 percent to the price of processed soybean product. Therefore, it is hoped 
that government should have the effective policy in pricing soybean, so that the increasing of local soybean 
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production among farmers can be seized. Besides, the influence of market power to soybean price also should be 
considered in developing soybean industry. 
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